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Introduction
Any assessment of the consequences of “job loss” must
include an understanding of the legal context in which
it occurs. This article provides a broad overview of that
context relative to some key legal considerations in a
reduction in force (RIF). In light of these key consider-
ations, I then describe a practical approach to planning
a RIF from a lawyer’s perspective.
Greatly complicating the lawyer’s approach to RIF
planning is the “lottery” mentality in contemporary cul-
ture, whereby individuals who sue their former em-
ployer believe that a certain jackpot awaits them. In
addition, many people seem unwilling to accept personal
responsibility for their own unsuccessful job perfor-
mance that leads to job loss. Even for employees who
perform their jobs well, too many seem unwilling to
accept the notion that in this economic system even
good or excellent performers lose their jobs without
a law necessarily being violated in the process.
The judicial system is not engaged in an academic
endeavor to weigh and test theories in order to discover
ultimate truths. Lawyers, judges, and juries have very
limited time, money, and information to make impor-
tant judgments that are often based on testimony from
individuals with faded memories about past events.
 A jury must then decide whether it is more probable
than not (at least 51 percent certain) that the former
employee’s termination violated a law.
Few life events are more devastating, emotionally
and financially, than losing a job. This fact necessarily
colors a lawyer’s perspective on assessing potential
liabilities associated with job loss. If a lawsuit proceeds
to trial, jurors may have jobs, may have lost jobs, or
may have family and friends who have lost jobs or
may lose their jobs. Most people can at least conceive
of facing a potential job loss and can imagine them-
selves in a situation similar to the plaintiff who lost a
job. Therefore, an employer forced to defend a claim
that a termination decision was unlawful must consider
the emotions and perspectives of a potential jury that
might judge the claim and award monetary damages
if it concludes a law was violated.
Some surveys of potential jurors have indicated
that an employer forced to defend a discrimination
claim is at a disadvantage before ever entering the
courtroom. One survey conducted by the Minority
Corporate Counsel Association and DecisionQuest1
revealed that more than 75 percent of white males,
who are usually regarded as most supportive of cor-
porations, report distrusting corporations due to events
such as the Enron scandal. Further, 85 percent of the
survey respondents indicated a belief that large cor-
porations hide information about their products until
they are caught by the government or in a lawsuit, and
75 percent of respondents indicated a belief that
managers and senior executives are more likely to
perjure themselves than lower-level employees.
Another DecisionQuest survey in conjunction with
the National Law Journal2 indicated that close to half
of the survey respondents disagreed with the statement
that most big companies treat all employees fairly
and only 29.8 percent of agreed with the statement.
Overall, 42.3 percent of respondents agreed that older
workers and minorities are the first to lose their jobs
in a layoff, although only 18 percent of the white re-
spondents agreed with the statement. More than two-
thirds (67.4 percent) of the respondents felt that race
discrimination and gender discrimination are still present
at many companies.95 Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
How do employers respond to a system of com-
plex employment laws that are applied in a costly and
challenging judicial context? They try to plan in ad-
vance so that they have the best possible chance to
stay out of court or to win the hearts and minds of a
judge and jury if necessary. To understand how this
goal can be accomplished, one must first have a funda-
mental framework of some of the legal claims employ-
ers can face, and the following two sections address
some key legal issues in that framework. The fourth
section then provides an overview of an approach to




Anti-discrimination laws now span a myriad of
protected classes under federal, state, and local laws.
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 19643 (Title VII)
prohibits discrimination on the basis of race, color,
religion, sex, and national origin. The Age Discrimi-
nation in Employment Act of 19674 (ADEA) prohib-
its discrimination against employees age 40 or older.
The Americans with Disabilities Act of 19905 (ADA)
and the Rehabilitation Act of 19736 (which covers fed-
eral contractors) prohibit disability discrimination.
The Equal Pay Act7 prohibits gender-based wage dis-
crimination, and the Pregnancy Discrimination Act8
prohibits pregnancy-based discrimination. These fed-
eral laws also prohibit retaliation against individuals
who oppose unlawful conduct or who engage in oth-
er “protected” activities, such as filing an administra-
tive charge of discrimination or participating in a
government investigation. Numerous state and local
laws mirror these federal prohibitions and also pro-
hibit other types of discrimination, such as discrimi-
nation on the basis of sexual orientation, marital status,
source of income, arrest records, and others.9
A number of strategies exist to avoid lawsuits or to
place the employer in the best possible position to de-
fend against a lawsuit. The legal framework in which a
lawyer approaches employment decisions during a RIF
guides these strategies. Generally, a plaintiff can prove
that her employment was terminated due to unlawful
discrimination via three types of claims: disparate treat-
ment, disparate impact, and pattern-and-practice claims,
each of which is described in the following sections.
Disparate treatment
A disparate treatment claim at first blush seems
simple. It is a claim that an employee within a protected
class was treated differently than an employee not in
the protected class, and the reason for the different
treatment is alleged to be intentional discrimination
based on the employee’s protected class. The methods
of proving disparate treatment, however, are not always
so straightforward.
Direct evidence may be the easiest way to prove
discrimination (or at least the easiest way to obtain a
jury trial). Direct evidence includes facts that prove
discriminatory animus toward the plaintiff without
resorting to inferences or presumptions.10 Some courts
also regard direct evidence as including circumstan-
tial evidence, so long as the additional requirement is
met that the evidence reflect directly on animus and
the employment decision being challenged.11 Derog-
atory comments that reflect bias are the most common
type of direct evidence, such as a supervisor referring
to an older employee as “no spring chicken” and stat-
ing that he would not advance in the company because
of his age,12 or a supervisor stating that the employee
(later plaintiff) is “getting close to retirement” and
thus the supervisor did not “want to spend time or
energy on her.”13
Not all derogatory comments, however, support
discrimination claims. Ambiguous statements that are
susceptible to a non-discriminatory interpretation might
not support a claim. Other statements, even if not
ambiguous, might not be connected directly to the
plaintiff if the statement was not made in connection
with the termination decision or was too remote in
time or context relative to the plaintiff. Examples of
such statements include generally referring to older
workers as “old timer dinosaurs” but not referencing
the plaintiff specifically,14 or referring to an employ-
ee as “burned out” and not able to change “old ways”
in the face of new management’s change directives.15
Likewise, comments by co-workers or managers not
involved in the decision affecting the plaintiff are not
relevant, unless the individuals had some influence
on the decision.16
Direct evidence cases usually get the headlines,
because a surreptitious tape recording or an electronic
mail message tends to provide greater shock value
for the press. In the overwhelming majority of cases,
however, no direct evidence exists. Without direct
evidence, a plaintiff must resort to an “indirect method”
of proving intentional discrimination. This method
was endorsed by the Supreme Court in McDonnell
Douglas Corp. v. Green.17
The first step in the McDonnell Douglas indirect
method of proof is for the plaintiff to establish a prima
facie case of discrimination. The prima facie case con-
sists of proving that 1) the plaintiff is a member of a pro-
tected class, 2) he suffered an adverse employment action,
3) he was at least minimally qualified to perform the96 2Q/2005, Economic Perspectives
job in question, and 4) a less qualified person not in
the protected class received the job.18 To be “similar-
ly situated” for purposes of comparison in proving a
discrimination claim, the comparators (that is, the
employees against whom the plaintiff is comparing
his own situation) must be substantially identical to
the plaintiff in all relevant respects within the context
of the employment decision at issue.19 Importantly, in
the age discrimination context, the plaintiff can com-
pare herself to an individual who is within the protect-
ed class of age 40 or older, so long as the comparator is
“substantially younger” than the plaintiff. At least
one federal court of appeals has adopted what ap-
pears to be a bright-line rule that an age difference of
six years or less fails to establish a prima facie case.20
If a prima facie case is established, the second
McDonnell Douglas step is for the employer to artic-
ulate a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for its
decision.21 In a RIF context, legitimate non-discrimi-
natory reasons for an individual’s layoff may include
cost-cutting considerations, performance, or the ne-
cessity for particular skills and abilities, among other
reasons. It is important to note that courts usually
will not second-guess an employer’s decision about
when it needs, or does not need, to conduct a RIF for
economic reasons unless other evidence of discrimi-
nation exists.22
After the employer articulates its reasons for the
RIF and termination decision, the third step of the
McDonnell Douglas indirect method of proof is for
the plaintiff to prove that the employer’s articulated
reason for the layoff decision is a pretext for discrim-
ination, that is, the reason is phony and the real rea-
son is unlawful discrimination.23 Plaintiffs bear a
heavy burden of proof in an economically motivated
RIF, because courts tend to recognize that such RIFs
often result in qualified employees losing their jobs
even in the absence of discrimination.24 Selecting
employees for layoff based on performance or skill
and ability has been sustained if the rating system
used to make the layoff decision is job-related and
the selection criteria are applied consistently.25 Quan-
titative measures such as sales results or productivity
have also been upheld as nondiscriminatory reasons
for layoff.26 Furthermore, when an entire job position
or function is eliminated so that no comparison to other
similarly situated individuals can be made, a discrim-
ination claim may fail.27 An employer is under no ob-
ligation to transfer employees whose job positions have
been eliminated, but if it does so, the transfer deci-
sions must be based on non-discriminatory criteria.28
When an employer lays off a protected class mem-
ber based on a reasonable belief that the individual is
less qualified than the person retained, courts are
generally not willing to recognize a discrimination
claim. A plaintiff cannot rely on her own subjective
belief that she is better qualified than individuals re-
tained in the RIF. Courts generally refrain from sub-
stituting their own judgment for the employer’s
judgment in reviewing layoff decisions in a RIF.29
A plaintiff faces a particularly significant obsta-
cle in establishing pretext when the decision-maker
and the plaintiff are members of the same protected
class, such as when both are black, both are women,
or both are approximately the same age.30 Such a de-
fense, however, is not airtight, and many courts rec-
ognize that a “same group” inference does not, standing
alone, foreclose a plaintiff’s claim.31 Another signifi-
cant obstacle to the plaintiff’s claim is the situation
where the decision-maker both hired and fired the
plaintiff within a relatively short period (from six
months to two years). In these circumstances, courts
are generally not willing to infer discrimination, and
the plaintiff’s claim may never reach a jury.32
Courts have generally held that an employee’s
high cost due to salary and benefits can be a reason-
able factor other than age on which to base a layoff
decision in a reduction of force. Thus, replacing
workers with less costly employees should not vio-
late the ADEA if the result is the layoff of older
workers. These courts have determined that seniority
and wage rates are analytically distinct from age, al-
though this subject remains controversial and may
implicate a disparate impact discrimination claim.33
Disparate impact claims
Discrimination can be established without direct
or indirect circumstantial evidence of discriminatory
motive via the “disparate impact” theory of liability.
The “disparate impact” theory of liability involves a
claim that an otherwise neutral policy, practice, or se-
lection criterion adversely affects a protected class of
individuals. Taking into account the possibility of a
disparate impact claim is a mandatory consideration
for any employer engaged in a RIF.
The disparate impact theory of liability in the
employment context was first recognized by the Su-
preme Court in Griggs v. Duke Power Co.34 The Su-
preme Court held that Duke Power could be held
liable under Title VII for race discrimination based
solely on statistical evidence. Duke Power required
that entry-level job applicants have a high school di-
ploma and achieve a satisfactory test score on an exam
administered during the application process, but these
requirements resulted in a statistically significant
screening-out of black applicants. Furthermore, Duke97 Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
Power was unable to show that the high school diplo-
ma and test score were job related and necessary for the
business. As a result, the court held that the statistical
evidence supported Title VII liability even without direct
or indirect evidence of racial animus.
It is essential that employers assess whether or
not a RIF will have a statistically significant disparate
impact on a protected class before finalizing layoff
decisions. If a disparate impact is identified, steps might
be taken to eliminate the statistical disparity or to validate
the RIF selection criteria as being job-related, consis-
tent with business necessity, and applied consistently.
A disparate impact analysis involves a statistical compar-
ison of a relevant work force population against an
appropriate, comparable group. A generally accepted
legal principle is that a statistical analysis showing a
difference of more than plus or minus two or three
standard deviations indicates that a disparate impact
likely is not by chance and might be motivated by un-
lawful discrimination.35 Where standard deviations are
in the range of one to three, courts have been more
skeptical of reaching a conclusion that the statistics,
standing alone, support a claim of unlawful discrimi-
nation.36 Furthermore, courts recognize that probative
statistics normally can be generated only if the num-
bers involved are sufficiently large to be susceptible
to a proper statistical analysis.37 On the other hand,
courts have recognized the “inexorable zero,” in which
a small sample size will not inhibit a finding of dis-
crimination when faced with a zero or near-zero se-
lection rate of individuals in the protected group.38
Using statistics as evidence in lawsuits involves
a battle of the experts, with lawyers trying to “spin”
their own experts’ analyses to convince a judge or jury
that discrimination likely did or did not occur. Judge
Posner, of the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, de-
scribed at least one court’s view of standard deviation
analysis as court evidence as follows:
The 5 percent [significance] test is arbitrary;
it is influenced by the fact that scholarly pub-
lishers have limited space and don’t want to
clog up their journals and books with statisti-
cal findings that have a substantial probability
of being a product of chance rather than of
some interesting underlying relation between
the variables of concern. Litigation generally
is not fussy about evidence; much eyewitness
and other nonquantitative evidence is subject
to significant possibility of error, yet no effort
is made to exclude it if it doesn’t satisfy some
counterpart to the 5 percent significance test.
A lower significance level may show that the
correlation is spurious, but may also be a
result of “noise” in the data or colinearity (cor-
relation between independent variables, such
as sex and weight); and such evidence, when
corroborated by other evidence, need not be
deemed worthless. Conversely, a high signifi-
cance level may be a misleading artifact of the
study’s design; and there is always the risk that
the party’s statistical witness ran 20 regressions,
one and only one of which supported the par-
ty’s position and that was the only one pre-
sented, though, in the circumstances, it was
a chance result with no actual evidentiary
significance. ... It is for the judge to say, on
the basis of the evidence of a trained statisti-
cian, whether a particular significance level,
in the context of a particular study in a partic-
ular case, is too low to make the study worth
the consideration of judge or jury.39
A critical aspect that must be considered to estab-
lish the validity (and persuasiveness) of a disparate im-
pact analysis is the use of proper comparative groups.
It may be appropriate to review pre- and post-RIF work
force statistics on a company-wide basis, location ba-
sis, departmental basis, or decision-maker basis. Rel-
evant work force comparisons might also consist of
all similarly situated employees whose retention or
layoff is governed by the same decision-maker(s). Often,
several relevant work force possibilities exist for anal-
ysis, and an employer planning a RIF would be wise
to assess a potential disparate impact in all groupings
that might reasonably be subject to challenge.
In addition, timing may be a factor to consider.
Ongoing layoffs over a period of months may result
in a cumulative disparate impact that may not be re-
vealed in a simple before-and-after snapshot analysis
of a particular layoff.40 On the other hand, a longer
time frame might also work to an employer’s advantage
if the average age of the work force has stayed the
same or increased, for example.
A further complicating factor is that the Supreme
Court recognized in Watson v. Fort Worth Bank and
Trust41 that the disparate impact theory of liability
encompasses both subjective and objective decision-
making. And, a statistical analysis of a neutral policy
should not be assessed at the “bottom line.” Instead,
a plaintiff must identify the specific aspect of the de-
cision-making process that can be properly separated
for statistical analysis and that has a disparate impact
on the protected group.42 For example, if layoffs are
based on a combination of factors, such as attendance
and performance, each weighted equally, members of
a protected group may allege a disparate impact with
respect to either criterion.98 2Q/2005, Economic Perspectives
The existence of a statistically significant disparate
impact on a protected class does not mandate a find-
ing of unlawful discrimination, however. An employer
can still defend its actions by proving that the challenged
policy or criterion “is job-related for the position in
question and consistent with business necessity.”43
After an employer meets its burden of production and
articulates a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for
the layoff, the plaintiff must respond to the specific
reasons given by the employer for the layoff decision.44
In the disparate impact context, where employee
performance is assessed based on subjective standards
(such as judgments about “teamwork” or “positive
attitude”), courts also tend to evaluate the checks in-
stituted by an employer on managers’ discretion. These
checks should be built into the selection process and
should include training. Another check is whether or
not decision-makers are diverse in terms of their de-
mographic make-up, whether they rely on evaluations
that are validated, and the extent to which initial de-
cisions are reviewed by established committees or
higher levels within the organization.45 If these checks
do not exist, a court may be less willing to accept the
employer’s business justification defense for its selec-
tion criteria that caused a disparate impact and instead
allow a jury to decide whether the defense should be
accepted.
Clearly, a generic “cookie-cutter” approach to a
statistical analysis of a RIF is dangerous. An employer
must be cognizant that the potential for insignificant
statistical results could be significant if the data are com-
bined in a different manner. Further complicating a dis-
parate impact analysis is that all employees are rarely
equal in terms of the likelihood they could be selected
for layoff. In almost every RIF, some employees might
be considered indispensable, which then calls into ques-
tion whether they should be included in any compara-
tive statistical analysis. The challenge, therefore, is to
conduct a statistical analysis at an organizational level
that is legally relevant, which is usually the level where
the decisions are actually made so that comparable em-
ployees can be identified and compared.
The availability of the disparate impact theory of
liability in age discrimination cases is very important
to consider in the RIF context. On March 30, 2005, the
United States Supreme Court issued its decision in
Smith v. City of Jackson46 and held that ADEA plaintiffs
can assert disparate impact age discrimination claims.
Until this decision, many courts had determined that
disparate impact claims were not available under the
ADEA. The Smith case is extremely important in the
RIF context, because ADEA claims tend to predomi-
nate in RIFs. However, while opening the door for
potentially more and broader ADEA claims, the court
simultaneously established hurdles that do not neces-
sarily exist for plaintiffs in Title VII disparate impact
claims. The court made it clear that disparate impact
claims under Title VII and the ADEA are different in
key respects.
First, the Smith court held that ADEA disparate
impact claims are more narrow than Title VII disparate
impact claims, because an ADEA plaintiff must identify
a specific test, requirement, or practice that causes a
disparate impact. A generalized policy or practice will
not suffice. At issue in Smith was a city’s decision to
raise starting salaries by a set amount of money, which
in turn increased older and more senior employees’ pay
by the same amount of money. However, the percent-
age increase was less for older (more senior) employees
as an overall percentage of their pay. The U.S. Supreme
Court characterized this pay raise as a generalized policy
that was not sufficiently specific to support an ADEA
disparate impact claim. After Smith, there is sure to
be substantial litigation over whether a test, requirement,
or practice is sufficiently “specific” as a matter of law.
Second, the Smith Court determined that the
city’s reasons for instituting the pay raise in the manner
that it chose were reasonable. Unlike Title VII, the
ADEA specifically allows employers to take actions
based on “reasonable factors other than age.”47 The
court determined that the city’s method of raising
starting salaries and the resulting effect on other sala-
ries was based on a reasonable plan. Furthermore, the
court made it clear that an ADEA plaintiff has the
burden to disprove the reasonableness of the factors
that the employer used to make employment decisions
(whereas this burden is not on a plaintiff in a Title
VII disparate impact claim). In light of courts’ usual
deference to employers’ business judgments, this proof
hurdle may be particularly challenging for most ADEA
plaintiffs to overcome. The Smith case, therefore, also
highlights the importance for employers to plan their
RIFs in advance in order to adequately evaluate and
document the reasonableness of the business judgments
being used for initiating the RIF and for making em-
ployment selections.
This much is clear about the potential for a dispar-
ate impact claim: A potential plaintiff might literally
troll through the employer’s work force looking for
some combination of data that can produce a statisti-
cally significant result. Moreover, even if a disparate
impact claim under the ADEA is not viable as a mat-
ter of law, statistical disparities may still be acceptable
evidence in a disparate treatment case. Thus, any
comprehensive assessment of the adverse effects of
RIF selections can generate a large array of statistical99 Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
results, likely even statistically significant results, and
a dizzying array of potential employment decisions
to check, recheck, and validate.
Pattern and practice claims
When allegations of disparate treatment relate to
an entire class of individuals, a plaintiff might claim
that a pattern-and-practice of discrimination exists.
In such a case, the plaintiff combines his own allega-
tions of disparate treatment with allegations that show
discrimination is a “standard operating procedure” for
the employer. To support this claim, more than isolat-
ed instances of discrimination must be shown, although
it is also not necessary to show discrimination against
every class member. Gross statistical disparities might
suffice to raise an inference of discrimination, but sub-
stantial anecdotal evidence of discriminatory acts must
be produced to maintain a pattern-and-practice claim.48
Other legal considerations in a reduction
in force
Leaves of absence
The Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993
(FMLA) requires employers to provide up to 12 weeks
of unpaid leave during a 12-month period for employees
to care for a newborn child, a newly adopted child, a
spouse, child or parent with a serious health condition,
or the employee’s own serious health condition.49 Several
states have even more stringent leave requirements.50
The FMLA forbids discrimination against employees
who have taken a family or medical leave or who are
on such a leave.51 Employees are entitled to return to
their jobs at the end of their FMLA leaves, or they must
be restored to an equivalent position with equivalent
employment benefits, pay, and other terms and con-
ditions of employment.52 However, nothing in the
FMLA entitles an employee to “any right, benefit, or
position to which the employee would have been en-
titled had the employee not taken the leave.”53 This
proviso should insulate employers from attack under
the FMLA when terminating the employment of an
employee on FMLA leave during a RIF, provided that
the employer can support its contention that the em-
ployee would have been selected for layoff if he had
been at work instead of on FMLA leave.54
The Americans with Disabilities Act
The ADA prohibits discrimination against individ-
uals because of their disabilities and requires an em-
ployer to reasonably accommodate an employee’s
disability if the employee can perform the essential
functions of his job with such an accommodation.55
The ADA prohibits selecting an employee for layoff due
to a desire to avoid making or continuing a reasonable
accommodation. In fact, the reasonable accommoda-
tion obligation under the ADA contemplates job re-
structuring, including modified work schedules and
other special arrangements that would allow the em-
ployee to perform his job.56 Therefore, in the midst of
a RIF, an employer may be required to engage in an
interactive process with a disabled employee to de-
termine whether he can continue to perform his job,
a new job, or a new combination of job duties. Further-
more, if an immediate or very near-term contribution
is critical to the company’s operations, an employee’s
leave of absence that might have been reasonable be-
fore the RIF might not be reasonable after implemen-
tation of the RIF.57 However, it is still critical to engage
the employee in an interactive process to determine
the continued leave restrictions; and sometimes in the
midst of the hectic pace of RIF planning, an employ-
er may neglect to do so.
WARN Act
In any significant job loss action instituted by an
employer, one eye should always be focused on The
Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notification Act
(WARN).58 WARN requires that covered employers
provide to unions, non-union affected employees,
and certain government officials 60-days written no-
tice before a covered “mass layoff” or “plant closing.”
A mass layoff or plant closing occurs when a sufficient
number of employees suffer an “employment loss” over
a relevant period (either 30- or 90-day rolling periods).
An employment loss is an involuntary termina-
tion (other than for cause), a layoff of more than six
months, or a reduction in work hours of more than 50
percent during each month of any six-month period.59
A plant closing occurs when there is a permanent or
temporary shutdown of a single site of employment,
or one or more facilities or operating units within a
single site of employment, with 50 or more employ-
ees suffering an employment loss during a 30-day
period. A mass layoff occurs when, during a 30-day
period, at least 50 employees suffer an employment
loss and the number of affected employees also con-
stitutes at least 33 percent of a single site’s employ-
ees. If 500 or more employees are affected over a
30-day period, a mass layoff occurs regardless of
whether the 33 percent threshold is met.60
However, significant employment losses often
do not occur in discreet 30-day time frames. Thus,
under WARN, employment losses for two or more
groups of employees at a single site of employment
may be aggregated over a 90-day period to establish
a plant closing or mass layoff if, and only if, each
group, standing alone, would be insufficient by itself100 2Q/2005, Economic Perspectives
to constitute a plant closing or mass layoff and only
if the layoffs are part of the same actions and causes
(and are not an attempt by the employer to evade the
requirements of WARN).61
From these statutory rules for aggregating employ-
ment losses, clearly one of the practical challenges of
complying with WARN is the ability of an employer
to anticipate the timing and number of employment
losses without inadvertently, or unavoidably, trigger-
ing WARN’s notice requirements. Finance and oper-
ations executives might not take into account WARN’s
requirements in their planning processes, especially
if they are unaware of the potential to aggregate job
losses over a long period. The financial effect of inad-
vertently triggering WARN can be significant (a suc-
cessful plaintiff can obtain up to 60 days of lost pay and
benefits and attorney’s fees).62
Some narrow exceptions or exemptions from no-
tice are allowed under WARN. For example, an em-
ployment loss does not occur when the closing or layoff
is the result of a relocation or consolidation of part or
all of an employer’s business and, prior to the closing
or layoff: 1) the employer offers to transfer the em-
ployee to a different site of employment within a rea-
sonable commuting distance with no more than a
six-month break in employment; or 2) the employer
offers to transfer the employee to any other site of
employment regardless of distances with no more
than a six-month break in employment, but only if
the employee accepts the transfer within 30 days of
the offer or of the closing or layoff, whichever is lat-
er.63 The uncertainties in this exception include defin-
ing a “reasonable commuting” distance, which may
vary depending on location conditions and customs.
Also, because of the time in which an employee has
to accept a transfer outside of a reasonable commuting
distance, a prudent employer might give the individual
a WARN notice just in case it has misjudged the reason-
ableness of commuting distances or is otherwise unsure
about the employee’s acceptance of the transfer offer.
WARN also contains limited exceptions for a “fal-
tering company” and for “unforeseeable business cir-
cumstances.”64 Under these exceptions, the employer
can provide less than 60 days notice, but must still
provide as much notice as is practicable. The “falter-
ing company” exception applies if, at the time notice
would be required, the employer is actively seeking
capital or business which, if obtained, would have
enabled the employer to avoid or postpone a shutdown;
but, the employer must reasonably and in good faith
believe that giving WARN notice would preclude the
employer from obtaining the capital or business. The
“unforeseeable business circumstances” exception also
allows less than 60 days notice where the WARN event
is caused by circumstances that were not reasonably
foreseeable to the employer.65 The burden of proof,
however, is on the employer to prove that the event
causing the employment losses was truly unforesee-
able to a reasonable employer in the same situation.
Waiver and release agreements
A key strategy for any employer engaged in a RIF
and desiring to avoid litigation necessarily includes pro-
viding severance pay to employees terminated in a RIF,
in exchange for their signing an agreement not to sue
the employer. In a RIF context, age discrimination claims
predominate and pose the most potential for serious
liability exposure for employers. Therefore, it is impor-
tant to understand the statutory requirements for ob-
taining a waiver of federal age discrimination claims.
The Older Workers Benefit Protection Act
(OWBPA)66 took effect on October 16, 1990, as an
amendment to the ADEA. OWBPA provides that an
individual may not waive her rights under the ADEA
unless the waiver is “knowing and voluntary.” Under
OWBPA, the waiver is knowing and voluntary if it
meets the following conditions: 1) it is a written agree-
ment that can be readily understood by the employee;
2) the waiver specifically refers to a waiver of rights
arising under the ADEA; 3) the employee must re-
ceive consideration (value) in addition to what she is
already entitled to; 4) the waiver is limited to rights
or claims arising as of, or prior to, the effective date
of the agreement; 5) the individual is advised in writ-
ing to consult with an attorney before signing the agree-
ment; 6) the employee is provided at least 21 days to
consider the agreement; and 7) after signing the agree-
ment, the individual has at least seven days to revoke
her signature (assent).67
If the waiver is offered in connection with an exit
incentive or employment termination program offered
to a group or class of employees (which usually in-
cludes a RIF), additional conditions must be met. In-
dividuals must be given at least 45 days to consider
the waiver agreement. The employer also must inform
each individual in writing and in a manner that can
be understood by the average person as to: 1) any class,
unit, or group of individuals covered by such program,
any eligibility factors for such program, and any time
limits applicable to such program; and 2) the job ti-
tles and ages of all individuals eligible or selected for
the program and the ages of all individuals in the same
job classification or organizational unit who are not
eligible or selected for the program.68
The information about groups, eligibility factors, job
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is calculated to allow an employee (and his lawyer) to
determine whether he could have at least a colorable
age discrimination claim, either disparate treatment
or disparate impact.69 If the information provided to
the employee is incomplete or flawed, the waiver
may not be valid. Of course, employers desire to
avoid lawsuits and thus may try to construct the in-
formational attachments to an OWBPA release so as
to comply with the law while not serving as a ready
guide for a plaintiff desiring to pursue litigation. Af-
fected employees who sign releases and desire to have
them invalidated may attack the substance or scope
of the information provided in the release in order to
have it voided. Relevant considerations include whether
the employer used the titles and classifications before
the layoffs; whether the titles and classifications were
used in assessing or choosing workers for layoff; and
whether the titles and classifications were meaning-
ful to the average worker in his or her understanding
of the workplace and layoff process.
Another difficult aspect of the attachments and
information required for a 45-day OWBPA release is
determining the appropriate group of affected employ-
ees to disclose in the attachment to the waiver agree-
ment. Regulations require disclosure of the employees
selected and not selected (and their ages) in the “de-
cisional unit.”70 However, the precise decisional group-
ing is often difficult to define when there are multiple
layers of decision-making involved. An example of
the potential difficulty posed by this regulation is Griffin
v. Kraft General Foods, Inc.71 In this case, Kraft de-
cided to shut down a plant in Georgia and lay off all
of the workers. Kraft, however, only disclosed the job
titles and ages at the affected plant. A plant in another
state was part of the “decisional unit” because both
plants were reviewed, but the Georgia plant was se-
lected. The court held that because “job classification”
and “organizational unit” are not limited to a single
plant, individuals in the same job classification or or-
ganizational unit may include employees at other plants
in the same company.
Putting the law to work—A practitioner’s
approach to planning a reduction in force
In light of the legal principles discussed above, it
is essential to involve a lawyer in the RIF-planning pro-
cess from its inception. The lawyer can help analyze
and develop the facts and tone of the entire RIF in a
confidential, privileged context and with the goal of
avoiding litigation. Even if litigation cannot be avoided,
a knowledgeable and experienced lawyer should be
able to identify potential litigation risks and to develop
ways to reduce or eliminate the risks to the employer.
Reasons for the RIF
Foremost, the RIF must be a legitimate employ-
ment action in order to take advantage of favorable
case law deferring to employer judgments and opinions.
The employer must identify the reasons for the RIF
and should document the validity of these reasons.
This documentation may be used later in a governmen-
tal proceeding or in court to prove that the employer’s
actions were justified and not discriminatory. Some
of the more common reasons for a RIF include: reduc-
tion in production; exiting a product, service, or busi-
ness; closure, consolidation, or relocation of operations;
restructuring, combining, or realigning to streamline
or eliminate departments, functions, jobs, or manage-
ment layers; a general need for cost savings; and au-
tomation, technology change, and efficiency efforts.
The public relations of a RIF can be very impor-
tant from a lawyer’s point of view (both external and
internal communications). The official and unofficial
communications about the RIF can be discovered in
related litigation by plaintiffs. Plaintiffs may try to use
these communications to attack the legitimacy of the
employer’s actions if there is conflict between the sub-
stance of the communications and the reasons articulated
during litigation for the RIF or position eliminations.
A jury may eventually read the company’s communi-
cations about the RIF, and any statements that seem
harsh or uncaring may be held against the employer
by the jury when determining liability and damages.
Further, sound employee relations demand a credible
communication effort. Too often, employees sue their
employers because they are surprised, confused, or
hurt by a decision they do not understand. Therefore,
an employer should anticipate the need for communi-
cation with employees at various stages of the RIF
process and ensure accuracy of the communications.
RIF guidelines
Guidelines for the RIF are a crucial aspect of avoid-
ing and defending against litigation. RIFs are usually
not common occurrences in most companies. There-
fore, existing policy manuals and handbooks may con-
tain outdated guidelines for a RIF that need updating.
These documents also may provide information about
employee expectations that should be factored into
the RIF plans. Where guidelines do not exist, are not
in effect, or need to be changed, the employer should
establish separate written guidelines to govern the
RIF process. The guidelines are vital to explaining and
justifying each termination or other employment decision.
The guidelines should list the criteria for employ-
ment decisions, and these criteria should be prioritized
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and documented. The prioritized criteria should reflect
the performance, skills, and abilities desired for the
restructured organization and for any newly created
or consolidated job positions. Then, the employer should
determine which employees’ performance, skills, and
abilities will or will not be needed and document the
reasons why. In some cases, indispensable skills and
abilities may trump performance rankings. When this
occurs, it will be important to communicate to employ-
ees the criteria used for making decisions; otherwise,
employees may resent the decision, consider it to be
unfair, and resort to legal actions against the company.
Past performance evaluations should always be
reviewed when making the RIF selections. Any validity
issues with the evaluations—such as supervisor bias,
lack of explanations for ratings, or all employees be-
ing ranked exactly the same—should be noted. Where
evaluations do not exist or have validity problems, other
documents on which performance can be assessed should
be identified relative to the RIF selection criteria.
In analyzing past performance reviews and per-
formance rankings during a RIF, the most common
management mistake is characterizing performance
in a conclusory fashion (for example, “satisfactory”
or “succeeds”). Instead, managers must document,
describe, or explain the facts supporting their conclu-
sions. When the conclusions are based on subjective
judgments, objective facts supporting the judgments
should be documented and described as much as pos-
sible. Judges and juries are often very skeptical of sub-
jective judgments, and when no or conflicting supporting
information is provided an employer has a greater li-
ability risk.
Because RIFs often negatively affect employees
whose performance is otherwise acceptable, the ques-
tion of intra-corporate transfers is often raised in an
effort to keep a good employee. Early in the RIF plan-
ning process, an employer should decide if it will al-
low such transfers because doing so may create
opportunities for other affected employees to claim
that they should have been considered for a possible
transfer or allowed to transfer too. When the person
who was not transferred is in a protected class, the
employer faces additional exposure to discrimination
claims. Each transfer during a RIF must be scrutinized
within the legal frameworks outlined in the previous
sections. Often, allowing transfers during a RIF com-
plicates an already complex process, and therefore
many employers simply decide not to allow transfers
even though a potentially valuable employee asset
may be lost.
Planning, selection, and implementation
procedures
An effective strategy for avoiding or winning
RIF-related litigation is to use a high-level committee
to review decision-making. Such a committee might
provide a greater check on fairness by including per-
sons other than direct management in the decision-mak-
ing process. These committees also can be diverse and
thus might provide a different and valuable perspec-
tive on direct supervisors’ decisions. Potential jurors
also might view such a committee positively when
determining either liability or potential damages in a
lawsuit. And, there may be a potential advantage to
having several witnesses supporting the RIF selection
decisions instead of a single decision-maker (particular-
ly if the single decision-maker can be accused of bias).
At least one member of the review committee
should be a human resources professional, who can
ensure that the committee reviews all necessary infor-
mation and applies the relevant criteria uniformly.
The committee’s members also should receive some
training in equal employment opportunity laws and
company policies in this regard. The committee should
be exposed only to relevant information in terms of
the selection guidelines. For example, inappropriate
references in personnel files, appraisals, and other
documents can be eliminated. Committee members
also can be insulated from information on age, race,
sex, or other protected status information. For the em-
ployer that decides to use a review committee, sub-
stantive minutes of deliberations and results must be
maintained. It is virtually impossible to reconstruct
the deliberations months or years after the fact. Faded
and potentially conflicting memories may lack credi-
bility and thus increase the risk of liability. For this
reason, committee-generated notes and documents
should be controlled and preserved with an eye toward
possible disclosure in litigation.
Early in the planning process, the employer should
determine which organizational units will experience
position eliminations and by what percentage or number.
It is important first to determine the specific positions—
not employees—that will be eliminated. After decid-
ing the new organizational structure, the selection criteria
should be applied to determine which employees will
be placed in the new organization and which will be
selected for separation. Also as part of this process, in-
dividuals on leaves of absence and those who may need
accommodations for disabilities should be identified,
so that application of the selection criteria does not
inadvertently displace such individuals without con-
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To defend against a discrimination or wrongful
discharge claim, documentation of the decision-making
process is critical. Again, if a jury can see and feel
the legitimate process, they are less likely to regard
the employer as having acted in a discriminatory or
arbitrary manner. But documentation can also sink
the litigation ship. Documents that are erroneous, that
conflict with the ultimate reasons for a decision, or
that show bias pose major impediments to accomplish-
ing the lawyer’s goal of a RIF free of lawsuits (or at
least free of major liabilities). A good way to prevent
the “bad document” scenario is to utilize the attorney–
client privilege.
The attorney–client privilege is a legal principle
that shields from disclosure all communications to and
from a lawyer when the communications are confiden-
tial and for the purpose of providing legal advice.72
Communications and related documents that are sub-
ject to the attorney–client privilege cannot be discov-
ered by the government or by plaintiffs in litigation.
However, communications will not be privileged from
disclosure if the privilege is waived by the person or
entity seeking the legal advice. A waiver may be in-
tentional or it may be via inadvertent disclosure of an
otherwise privileged communication.
An example of a RIF-planning strategy relative
to the attorney–client privilege is as follows: Decision-
makers should complete a preliminary selection form
for each affected position, listing the candidates, the
person selected for layoff, and the reasons for the se-
lection in accordance with established selection guide-
lines and criteria. The forms used by the decision-makers
should not include any demographic information. Of
extraordinary importance is that this form be issued
and completed at the request of a lawyer and express-
ly for the purpose of the lawyer providing a legal opin-
ion concerning the information on the form. This entire
process must be kept confidential. The form and all
communications associated with it should be labeled
“privileged and confidential/prepared for consultation
with counsel” and delivered to the employer’s lawyers,
including all drafts.
A lawyer, or a human resources representative
acting for the lawyer, should then add demographic
and protected class data, and note any special issues
that might generate claims, such as recent FMLA leaves,
disabilities, whistle-blowing activity, union organiz-
ing activity, recent harassment or other serious com-
plaints, and complaints about supervisors and managers.
The lawyer then analyzes the data for potential claims
against the company. If potential claims are identified,
they can be addressed and remedied in the confiden-
tial context of attorney–client communications. If
statistical disparities are identified, selection criteria
can be evaluated to ensure they are job related and ap-
plied uniformly. Other criteria might also be ex-
plored to determine whether they can achieve the
same business goals with a lesser impact on a protect-
ed group. If validated criteria are applied uniformly
but still result in a statistically significant impact on a
protected group, it is not necessary to change the de-
cisions merely to eliminate the disparity, because the
validation and auditing process should have confirmed
that the underlying decisions were made on a non-
discriminatory basis. In fact, manipulating the deci-
sion process merely to eliminate statistical disparities
can result in reverse discrimination claims, that is, men
claiming discrimination because women received
preferential treatment or whites claiming race discrim-
ination because blacks received preferential treatment.
Such reverse discrimination claims are usually evalu-
ated under the same legal standards as claims by mi-
norities, women, and older workers.
A lawyer’s review of the RIF decisions also should
include identifying individuals who are more likely
than others to initiate claims against the company.
Decisions that negatively affect such individuals must
be evaluated carefully in order to avoid or to win any
potential litigation. This evaluation includes not only
reviewing the legal merits of the employment decision,
but also examining supporting documents, overall in-
dicators of “fairness,” the personality and potential
bias of the decision-maker, and any corroborating views
of supervisors and peers. Witness credibility is also
evaluated (in the event a trial is required), as well as
any past comments or complaints about either the de-
cision-maker or the affected employee.
After the legal review, and after selections are fi-
nalized, decision-makers should complete a final selec-
tion form. This final form should contain the rationale
for selections in accordance with the selection criteria.
All relevant documentation should be included with
the form, and any required reviews and approvals should
be evidenced on the form. The final form will not be
privileged, and will be the primary piece of evidence
that the employer can use to defend the selection de-
cision if faced with a lawsuit.
Finally, an often-neglected aspect of the RIF is
the post-RIF time frame. Lawyers representing plain-
tiffs often focus on this time frame, searching for in-
formation that might indicate that the stated reasons
for an employee’s layoff are false. For example, if an
employer contends that a position is eliminated, the
plaintiff’s lawyer might ask to review post-RIF hiring
decisions. If the lawyer identifies new hires shortly
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former duties, the lawyer may contend that the ratio-
nale for selecting the plaintiff was a sham and a pre-
text for discrimination. Likewise, an alleged justification
for position eliminations—such as elimination of a
product line or expected sales emphasis in particular
products—might never materialize. When this happens,
a plaintiff’s lawyer might contend that the original
justification was not truthful and was instead just a
cover-up for discrimination. To avoid such claims, a
prudent employer might impose a prohibition on hir-
ing into positions that were vacated during a RIF. Also,
when a RIF is due to cost-cutting, an employer should
freeze hiring during and after a RIF for a significant
period in order to avoid a claim that the cost-reduction
justification for the RIF was a sham. If business needs
require hiring at some level during or after the RIF,
these business needs should be reviewed, justified,
documented, and approved, with a focus on achiev-
ing the organization’s business need without expos-
ing it to potential lawsuits.
Conclusion
In addition to the issues addressed in this article,
a host of other legal issues should be considered rela-
tive to reductions in force. Employers might consider
voluntary exit incentive programs, which implicate an
entirely different set of procedures, laws, and regula-
tions, before instituting involuntary programs. Com-
mon law issues, such as claims that employment
contracts are breached by the RIF or that an implied
contract exists requiring “just cause” for a termination
must be assessed. Non-competition and confidential-
ity concerns also play a significant role in protecting
an employer’s trade secrets and proprietary informa-
tion during and after a work force restructuring. Addi-
tionally, union relations issues relative to contracting
out, plant relocations, plant shutdowns, and general lay-
offs involve possible legal requirements that the em-
ployer bargain with a union about the business decision
before implementing it and that the employer bargain
with the union about the effects of the business decision.
The ability of human resource managers and day-
to-day supervisors to comprehend and to apply a com-
plex array of employment laws and regulations is limited.
Courts are also challenged in their ability to grapple
with unique employment scenarios and decisions in
an ever-changing area of the law. Employment laws—
statutes, regulations, and case law—have reached a
level of complexity that makes it extremely difficult
for employers and employees to understand their rights
and obligations. When the result is litigation, one can-
not help but believe that resources are unnecessarily
wasted regardless of the outcome of a lawsuit.
Litigation is expensive and time-consuming, of-
ten taking years to resolve and costing tens or hundreds
of thousands of dollars before achieving a resolution.
Employers must pay for their own lawyers’ time and
expenses, and if a plaintiff prevails in a discrimination
lawsuit, the employer faces monetary damages that
can include an award of lost pay and benefits, com-
pensatory damages for emotional pain and suffering,
punitive damages, and payment of the plaintiff’s at-
torney fees. Under Title VII and the ADA, compen-
satory and punitive damages are capped at $300,000
for large employers, and although no compensatory
or punitive damages are allowed under the ADEA, lost
pay can be doubled as a “liquidated” damages award
if a willful violation of the act is found. However, many
state laws contain no such limitations on monetary
awards. Clearly, six- and seven-figure jury verdicts
are a real threat to employers in our federal and state
jury systems, and class action claims pose the poten-
tial for even larger awards. In addition, it is difficult
to put a price tag on the time spent by corporate man-
agers away from performing their job duties in order
to deal with litigation.
The inefficiencies and costs associated with
court litigation could be avoided in light of the U.S.
Supreme Court’s decisions that statutory discrimina-
tion claims can properly be submitted to binding ar-
bitration and that private, mandatory arbitration
agreements between employers and employees are
valid under the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA).73
However, under the FAA, state contract laws determine
the validity of arbitration agreements (to the extent
the laws are not conflicting with the FAA). Litigation
related to the enforceability of arbitration agreements
has resulted in different rulings among federal and
state courts concerning the elements of a valid arbi-
tration agreement. So far, many employers are still
taking a wait-and-see approach to instituting arbitra-
tion programs until the law is clearer. Congress could
follow the Supreme Court’s lead and take the addi-
tional step of amending the FAA to preempt all state
laws concerning arbitration and to provide for the
development of a national common law on the enforce-
ability of arbitration agreements instead of relying on
varying state laws. Such an amendment might also in-
clude minimum statutory standards for an arbitration
agreement to be knowing, voluntary, and binding.
Because private arbitration remains underutilized
and subject to continuing suspicions about individuals’
ability to vindicate important public rights in a private
forum, another public policy response that might be ex-
plored is the development of a national administrative
court system exclusively for employment claims.105 Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
Such a system could provide administrative judges
who have expertise in employment law and the employ-
er–employee relationship. The process could also be
more efficient if the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission’s (EEOC) investigatory powers were
expanded so that an EEOC probable cause finding
would be required as a prerequisite for an administra-
tive hearing. And, appeals from an administrative de-
cision could be allowed to the federal courts, but the
courts should only have jurisdiction to review the de-
cision under a limited “abuse of discretion” or similar
deferential standard. Employees would give up jury
trials for their claims, but their potential monetary
remedies might be maintained and their claims could
be resolved more expeditiously than in the current
process. Further benefits for employers would be re-
alized if this federal administrative system were cou-
pled with federal anti-discrimination laws becoming
the legal standard for the entire country, displacing
(preempting) state laws on the same subject matters.
The result could be more predictable—uniform laws
applied in a more efficient administrative process.
For now, however, employers face the uncertain-
ties of a jury system and laws that differ substantially
among the states. After all the complex business and
legal analyses are conducted, argued, and challenged,
every employment lawyer knows that a jury’s decision
will likely be governed by whether it considers the
termination decision to be fair. Does the law require
fairness? No. Will the judge instruct the jury that it
must decide the case based on fairness? No. But fair-
ness and witness credibility will be the difference be-
tween winning and losing a trial.
Therefore, extraordinary attention should be giv-
en to the “tone” of the entire reduction procedure and
how it is conducted. In general, well-planned, “humane”
procedures create less liability (especially with ju-
ries). Outplacement assistance and the availability of
counseling through employee assistance plans may
also tend to defuse the emotional aspects of the re-
ductions. Ultimately, the best long-range protection
is provided by soundly conceived and well-adminis-
tered performance appraisal and succession planning
systems that are in place before a RIF is ever needed.
These systems can provide valuable data for a later
restructuring or reduction in force. Moreover, where
such systems are in place, employees are much less
likely to be surprised by their supervisors’ opinions
of their performance and thus less likely to be suspi-
cious of the motives behind a layoff decision.74106 2Q/2005, Economic Perspectives
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